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An emerging direction for authenticating people is the adoption of biometric authentication systems. Biometric credentials
are becoming increasingly popular as a means of authenticating people due to the wide range of advantages that they
provide with respect to classical authentication methods (e.g., password-based authentication). The most characteristic feature
of this authentication method is the naturally strong bond between a user and her biometric credentials. This very same
advantageous property, however, raises serious security and privacy concerns in case the biometric trait gets compromised. In
this article, we present the most challenging issues that need to be taken into consideration when designing secure and privacy-
preserving biometric authentication protocols. More precisely, we describe the main threats against privacy-preserving biometric
authentication systems and give directions on possible countermeasures in order to design secure and privacy-preserving biometric
authentication protocols.
1. Introduction
Biometric authentication is a quick, accurate, and user-
friendly tool that offers an efficient and reliable solution
in multiple access control systems. A typical example of
biometric authentication systems (BAS) is access control
systems equipped with sensors (e.g., for iris or fingerprint
scans). In this case, the sensor captures the biometric trait of
the person who requests access, while access is granted only
after the person has been recognised as an authorised user of
the system. One of the main advantages of biometrics is that
they do not require to memorise complicated passwords or
carry tokens along since they cannot be forgotten or lost.
While BAS provide important usability advantages, they
are susceptible to threats, like any other security system. For
biometric authentication, however, a successful attack can
have severe implications in the users’ lives and privacy. Unlike
passwords or tokens, biometric credentials cannot be kept
secret or hidden, and stolen biometrics cannot be revoked as
easily [1, 2]. Thus, the risk of them being compromised (i.e.,
captured, cloned, or forged) is high and may lead to identity
theft or individual profiling and tracking in case the templates
are used and cross-matched in different biometric databases.
In addition, stolen biometrics can be used to learn sensitive
information about their owners, such as ethnic group, genetic
information [3], andmedical diseases [4], or even to perform
illegal activities by compromising health records [5].
It is therefore of fundamental importance to develop
privacy-preserving BAS, that is, biometric authentication
systems that can mitigate the aforementioned privacy and
security risks listed.
In this article, we present themain challenges in achieving
privacy-preserving biometric authentication and we high-
light themain threats associated with privacy issues. Further-
more, we describe the main countermeasures to prevent the
information leakage in biometric authentication as well as
novel possible directions for the design of efficient privacy-
preserving biometric authentication protocols.
Paper Organisation. Section 2 describes how biometric
authentication works and the challenges encountered to
achieve accurate biometric authentication. It also explains
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Figure 1: The authentication phase in a biometric authentication system with a distributed architecture.
the main differences between privacy-preserving and non-
privacy-preserving systems.Themain threats against privacy-
preserving BAS are described in Section 3. A particular
emphasis is given to biometric reference recovery attacks as
well as biometric sample recovery attacks. Section 4 collects
suggestions for possible mitigations and countermeasures
against the attacks described in Section 3. Eventually, Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper.
2. Preliminaries on Biometric
Authentication Systems
Generally speaking, a biometric authentication system works
in the following way. First, a user (e.g., an employee) registers
to the system by providing her identity together with her
biometric template that becomes her reference template (reg-
istration phase). Subsequently, the user can get authenticated
into the system (authentication phase) by submitting an
identity and a biometric template, called fresh template. The
system performs a matching process, which aims to check
if the provided fresh template is close enough to the one
stored for the given user [6] (in which case the user is
authenticated/accepted) or not (in which case the user is
rejected). Common BAS aim at authenticating users regard-
less of what the system may leak about the user’s biometric
credentials to third parties. Such processes protect privacy
at the design stage rather than being an aftermath action
adopted as an add-on service at later stages. In contrast,
privacy-preserving BAS provide user authentication through
a privacy-aware process that includes privacy at the design
stage of the system. Intuitively, privacy-preserving BAS
transform biometric traits into vectors of data in secure
domains, in such a way that the system can guarantee the
anonymity of the biometric trait owner, while being able to
distinguish among the clients in the system.
The base for biometric authentication is the extraction
of a biometric trait from the human body or behaviour.
Common biometric traits used nowadays for authentication
are voice, signature, DNA, fingerprint [7], iris [8], and ear
shape [9]. In all cases, the biometric trait is a distinctive
characteristic that is measurable and identifies (almost)
uniquely each individual. In practice, the data collecting
process of biometric templates is by itself a challenging
task due to the inherent noise and the natural variability
of biometric credentials [10]. For example, two scans of the
same fingerprint can differ because of the variance in finger
pressure, orientation, dirt, or sweat [11]. To overcome the
presence of noise, which is inherited in biometric credentials
and in the collection process, the comparison between a fresh
biometric template and a stored one always takes into account
approximation.
In order to understand how biometric authentication
is performed and subsequently discuss what attacks and
mitigations are possible, we need to formally present the
two main phases that compose a privacy-preserving BAS.
Figure 1 depicts the authentication phase for a distributed
architecture [12, 13], that is, where every entity involved
in the authentication process performs only a single task.
More precisely, by adopting a distributed architecture in the
biometric authentication process (e.g., computational server
(CS), authentication serverAS, databaseDB), it is possible
to limit the amount of information each entity has at its
disposal and thus avoid single point of failures. Furthermore,
a distributed architecture provides higher privacy guarantees
since no single entity has access to all sensitive data (i.e., fresh
biometric template, stored biometric template, and user’s
identity).
This architecture is adopted as a security countermea-
sure against internal honest-but-curious adversaries. In most
systems, even if one entity among CS, DB, and AS is
corrupted, an adversary (malicious third party) cannot learn
anything about the biometric templates unless it behaves
maliciously. In nondistributed architectures, the computa-
tional server and the authentication servermerge into a single
entity, leading to a single point of failure.
The Enrolment Phase. This phase takes place only once and
is performed before the authentication. A user C (client)
registers to a trusted party her biometric template (usually
encrypted in a digital string ?̃?) along with her identity
(possibly a pseudonym ÎD).These two data are then stored in
the databaseDB of the authentication system.Once enrolled
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in the system, the client can authenticate herself an unlimited
number of times.
The Authentication Phase. This phase is depicted in Figure 1.
The client provides her fresh biometric trait (through the
sensorS) together with her identity. These two pieces of
information are then elaborated by the sensor and trans-
mitted to the computational server CS, as 𝑏󸀠 (e.g., the
encryption of the fresh template) and ÎD (e.g., a pseudonym).
The computational server CS queries the database DB for
the stored template ?̃? linked to ÎD. After receiving ?̃?, CS
computes the (possibly encrypted) distance 𝑑 between 𝑏󸀠 and
𝑏 (e.g., 𝑑 could be the Euclidean or the Hamming distance).
Let Δ = 𝑑(𝑏, 𝑏󸀠) be the output that CS sends to AS. The
authentication server uses Δ to derive the actual distance
between 𝑏󸀠 and 𝑏 and compares it with 𝜏, the threshold of the
system. The threshold 𝜏 can be thought as the accuracy level
of the system; indeed, if the templates are close enough (i.e.,
𝑑(𝑏, 𝑏󸀠) < 𝜏), the user is authenticated; otherwise the user is
rejected.
In classical authentication systems (i.e., non-privacy-
preserving), the biometric data is sent and stored in the clear.
In this case, 𝑏󸀠 = 𝑏󸀠, ?̃? = 𝑏, and ĨD = ID. In these systems
an eavesdropper adversary can easily retrieve the biometric
templates of any user.
In contrast, privacy-preserving biometric authentication
systems aim at protecting the users’ biometric templates
against both passive and active adversaries. A common
practice is to preserve the user’s privacy by encrypting the
sensitive data. For example, Yasuda et al.’s privacy-preserving
biometric authentication scheme works as follows [14]. The
sensor S encrypts the provided fresh biometric template
𝑏󸀠 obtaining 𝑏󸀠 = Enc(𝑏󸀠) (here the encryption scheme is
based on a packing method for polynomials). For privacy
reasons also the reference template 𝑏 is stored encrypted as
?̃? = Enc(𝑏). The computational server computes Δ, which
is the encrypted Hamming distance of the two templates,
and forwards it toAS. The authentication server decrypts Δ
and checks whether the distance is less than the predefined
threshold 𝜏. In the protocol outlined above, the biometric
templates are always handled in an encrypted way. The only
entity in possession of the decryption key isAS, which never
receives an encrypted template, but only encrypted distances.
3. Main Threats against Privacy-Preserving
Biometric Authentication Systems
Attacks against privacy-preserving biometric authentication
systems aim at learning information about the user’s biomet-
ric trait or identity.What we describe in this section are attack
strategies and goals connected to security and privacy issues
that have severe impact in users’ lives, especially considering
the irrevocability of biometrics templates [1]. For a detailed
description of the adversarial model, we refer the reader to,
for example, [15–17]. Below, we list the four main threats that
afflict privacy-preserving biometric authentication systems
[18].
(1) Biometric Sample Recovery. In this case, the goal of the
adversary is to determine a fresh biometric template 𝑏󸀠 which
is accepted by the authentication server.The consequences of
a successful attack are similar to the reference recovery attack,
apart from the fact that the produced matching template
may differ from the user’s real one, and so the adversary
can recover less information regarding the user’s private
information (e.g., physical characteristics and DNA).
(2) Biometric Reference Recovery. A nonauthorised party
(usually called the adversary) succeeds in recovering the
(plaintext) reference biometric template 𝑏. This is the most
harmful threat since by recovering the reference template
the adversary may gain unauthorised access to any system
that uses 𝑏 as a reference template and also collect sensitive
information about the user’s physical characteristics and
health.
(3) User’s Traceability. An unauthorised party (e.g., the adver-
sary) is able to trace a user’s authentication attempts over
different applications. Consequences of a successful trace-
ability attack are cross-matching, profiling, and tracking of
individuals.
(4) User’s Distinguishability. The adversary recovers the link
between a biometric template 𝑏, or 𝑏󸀠, and a user identity ID.
Compromising this relation may lead to the disclosure of
more sensitive information and often breaks the anonymity
of the system.
3.1. Biometric Sample Recovery Attacks. Biometric sample
recovery attacks are performed in two main ways: via tem-
plate spoofing (e.g., extracting the fingerprint left on a glass) or
via brute-force techniques. The most common way to bypass
a BAS is by using a spoof of a biometric trait. A spoof
refers to a fake or an artificial biometric template that does
not correspond to a live person. These include, for instance,
gummy fingers, residual fingerprint impressions of legitimate
users, photographs of legitimate users, or voice recordings
of legitimate users. The only alternative to these practical
techniques is to estimate a valid biometric sample using brute-
force strategies.
Below,we list the possible brute-force strategies that could
be adopted in recovering a valid biometric template [19].
Luckily, all the approaches run in exponential time and thus
most of the current biometric authentication systems are
secure.
In the following, we assume that the adversary can see the
result of the authentication processOutAS at each trial and
that the templates are binary vectors. Binary representation
of biometric traits is not far from reality since this is the case
for biometric authentication based on iris templates [20].
Blind Brute-Force. The easiest algorithm to find a matching
template from scratch is the blind brute-force. In this case, the
attacker picks biometric traits at random. This corresponds
to randomly selecting and trying biometric templates from
the available space (i.e., 𝑏󸀠 𝑅←󳨀 Z𝑛𝑞) until one template gets
accepted by the system.
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Figure 2: An intuitive example of what the set-covering problem is. The aim is to cover the largest possible area in the space Z210 using 5
circles. On (a), the centres of the circles are chosen at random (the covered area is less than 70%), while on (b), we provide a better covering
of the space (the covered area is about 85%). Finding the optimal covering corresponds to solving an NP-hard problem for large dimensions
of the space.
Set-Covering. This attack strategy represents the optimal
brute-force solution: pick a random trial template from the set
of potential candidates (which at the beginning is the whole
space Z𝑛𝑞). If the trial template is rejected, remove from 𝐶
all the points that are within 𝜏 distance from it, and pick
another point at random from the updated set 𝐶. Although
thismethod possibly eliminates from𝐶 some of thematching
points (if the trial templates are picked with a distance of
2𝜏 one from the other) if such an algorithm exists and was
efficient, it would be exponentially fast in finding a matching
template. Such an algorithm could also be used to solve the
set-covering problem, which is known to beNP-hard [21]. An
intuition of this geometrical challenge is given in Figure 2.
The points on the plane are biometric templates, and the
trial samplings are the centres of the green circles. The green
circles delimit the acceptance region around the tried point
and have radius equal to the threshold 𝜏 of the system.Greedy
approximations to the optimal solution of the set-covering
problem are reachable in an efficient way, in which case the
number of trials the adversary needs to perform is only a
factor of 𝑂(𝜏 ln(𝑛 + 1))more than the optimal cover.
3.2. A Biometric Reference Recovery Attack. The most suc-
cessful strategy to perform a biometric reference recovery
attack is to use a hill-climbing technique [18] to perform a
centre search attack [18]. The attack can be launched under
three conditions [19, 22, 23]:
(1) The adversary is in possession of a matching template
(maybe spoofed) for the target biometric reference.
(2) The adversary is able to see the output of the
authentication process (OutAS). For instance, this
information could be in an access control system, a
door that is opening.
[2] [3] [6]
[9]
[9]
[8]
[8]
[7]
[7]
[6]
[5]
[5]
[4]
[4]
[3]
[2]
[1]
[1]
[0]
[0]
Figure 3: Example of a recovery template attack for a BAS with
biometric traits represented as vectors in Z210 and with threshold
𝜏 = 2.The values are chosen ad hoc to be able to picture the example
in an easy and intuitive way and do not reflect the parameters used
in real applications (usually, 𝑞 is smaller than 𝑛 and 𝑛 ≫ 𝜏 is in the
order of 2048).
(3) The matching process between a fresh and a stored
template relies on specific distances, called leaking
distances, which include the Euclidean and the Ham-
ming distance.
Figure 3 provides an intuition of the attack strategy. In the
example (Figure 3) the stored reference template is the point
𝑏 = (6, 3) and the given matching 𝑏󸀠 is in the point (6, 4).
Thematching templates are the points in the region delimited
by the green circle. The adversary starts from the first
component of the given matching template, the point (6, 4),
and increments it repeatedly by a factor 1. When rejected,
on the point (9, 4) denoted by the red bullet with a white
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cross, the attacker learns that the previous point is the last
one inside the acceptance circle.The same strategy is repeated
starting from the point 𝑏󸀠 and decreasing (by a factor 1 each
time) the first component until rejection, and for the other
component of the template. After discovering the coordinates
of the four boundary points in the acceptance circle, the
attacker can compute the coordinates of its centre, that is,
find the digital representation of the biometric reference
template.
This reference recovery attack is very efficient as it only
requires a number of authentication attempts that are linear
in the length of the biometric template [19]. Moreover,
it can be mounted against many biometric authentication
systems (privacy-preserving or not) and even systems that
employ secure multiparty computation techniques including
somewhat homomorphic encryption [23].
Another strategy to performbiometric reference recovery
attacks is to gain access to the database and try to decrypt
the target template. This approach, however, is way less
successful since normally the employed cryptographic tech-
niques used to protect the templates’ privacy are proven to be
secure.
3.3. User Traceability andDistinguishability. Generally speak-
ing, attacks against the user’s privacy (in the sense of
traceability and distinguishability) do not aim at gathering
information about the user’s biometric credential in itself, but
rather at profiling and identifying the target user among all
the users of one or more biometric systems.
The main attack strategy to trace users in privacy-
preserving BAS is the following. The attacker gets access
to different databases (possibly in use by different biomet-
ric authentication systems) and successfully traces a user’s
authentication attempts, by checking which record of the
database is queried (as match for the authentication). Note
that the above approach does not require the attacker to
know the user’s credential, as long as the databases store the
biometric credentials in the same way (i.e., using the same
encryption mechanism and the same secret key). Luckily, in
real life, this is a very strong assumption which happens only
seldom [18].
In simplewords, user distinguishability can be considered
as user tracing over different authentication attempts in the
same or different authentication systems.That is, the attacker
can recognise the target user among the other users present
in the biometric authentication system. This attack is always
successful if the attacker learns the mapping from the set of
identities to the set of (encrypted) templates. In other words,
an attacker can distinguish users if he learns that to a cer-
tain identity ID corresponds a certain (possibly encrypted)
template 𝑏. A solution would be to keep the mapping ID 󳨃→ 𝑏
secret or to use a (secure) pseudorandom mapping. Another
possibility is to ensure that the communication channels
between the entities involved in the BAS are secure or
that the information transmitted is encrypted using chosen
plaintext attacks- (CPA-) secure systems.
We present more detailed explanations of methods to
achieve user privacy in biometric authentication in the next
section.
4. Challenges and Countermeasures
Themain question that one needs to address when designing
a privacy-preserving biometric authentication protocol is:
How to guarantee privacy-preservation without downgrading
the accuracy of a biometric authentication system?
Among the most challenging problems in designing effi-
cient and privacy-preserving biometric authentication sys-
tems there are (1) the resistance to impersonation attacks; (2)
the irrevocability of biometric templates; and (3) guarantee
that personal information remains private. In the following,
we provide a list of methods that have been used to achieve
privacy-preserving authentication, andwe highlight themain
advantages and disadvantages of each approach.
4.1. Biometric Template Protection. Most existing privacy-
preserving biometric authentication approaches focus on
storing and transmitting a modified version of the orig-
inal biometric templates in order to avoid the danger of
eavesdropping sensitive data or the case of compromised
databases.One direction in order to combat the privacy issues
associated with biometric authentication is the employment
of biometric template protection schemes such as cancellable
biometrics and biohashing. Examples of cancellable finger-
prints were proposed by Ang et al. [1], while Connell et al.
[8] proposed cancellable iris biometrics. Different biohashing
schemes are presented in [24]. Although biohashing offers
low error rates while guaranteeing a quick authentication
phase, biohashing schemes are vulnerable to several attacks
[25, 26].
4.2. Cryptographic Primitives. The direct employment of
cryptographic primitives seems to be the most robust
approach so far to tackle the challenging problem of privacy-
preservation. Most of the state-of-the-art cryptographic pro-
tocols, however, were not designed taking into consideration
the inherent variability of biometric data. In fact, cryptog-
raphy tends to amplify small differences and it is not error-
tolerant (e.g., hashing, AES, and RSA). The main crypto-
graphic tools used to combat the leakage of private infor-
mation during biometric authentication are secure multiparty
computation (SMPC) [14], verifiable computation (VC), and
bloom filters (see Box 2).
4.2.1. Secure Multiparty Computation in Biometric Authen-
tication. Cryptographic primitives that are often employed
in SMPC include homomorphic encryption, oblivious transfer,
and garbled circuits, which will be presented shortly, and are
often combined to obtain privacy-preserving BAS [27, 28].
From a theoretical point of view, SMPC techniques allow to
maximise the utility of information without compromising
the user privacy. A more formal intuition on how SMPC
works is given in Box 1.
It is understood that SMPC is an incredibly useful tool
for the design of privacy-preserving biometric authentication
protocols. Multiple existing schemes, indeed, rely on SMPC
[12, 13].
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is perhaps the most suit-
able cryptographic primitive (inside the SMPC framework)
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The general setting for SMPC is the following. The system is made up of𝑁 entities 𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . , 𝑝𝑁 that jointly compute some public
function 𝑓 based on some individually secret data 𝑑1, 𝑑2, . . . , 𝑑𝑁, without revealing their private inputs to one another. In other
words, SMPC allows the interactive computation among multiple parties in such a way that at the end of the process no
participant 𝑝𝑖 can learn more from 𝑓 and the result𝐷 = 𝑓(𝑑1, 𝑑2, . . . , 𝑑𝑁), than what 𝑝𝑖 could learn from her own secret data
𝑑𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁. It is easy to see that SMPC can be very useful in privacy-preserving biometric authentication especially in
the distributed scenario, where multiple entities are involved in the authentication process [12] (e.g., a databaseDB,
an authentication serverAS and a matcherCS). In this case, the function 𝑓 could be the distance between the fresh and the
stored biometric template and the goal would be to guarantee the secrecy of the biometric templates (fresh and stored).
Box 1
Bloom Filters in Biometric Authentication.This method is the main alternative to the employment of leaking distances [29, 30].
Intuitively, a Bloom filter F𝐴 is an𝑁-bit string which represents a set 𝐴 ⊆ 𝐷 (e.g., 𝐴 the acceptance area, and𝐷 is the space of all
biometric templates). The encoding of 𝐴 into F𝐴 is done using 𝑘 independent hash functions ℎ1, ℎ2, . . . , ℎ𝑘 : 𝐷 → [0,𝑁 − 1] in the
following way. For each element 𝑏 ∈ 𝐴, and for each 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘, the bits at positions ℎ𝑖(𝑏) of the Bloom filter F𝐴 are set to 1 (the other
bits are set to 0). To test if an element 𝑏󸀠 is in 𝐴 using the bloom filter, it is sufficient to check whether the bits of F𝐴 at positions
ℎ𝑖(𝑏
󸀠) are 1, equal to for all 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘. If this is the case, one can deduce that 𝑏󸀠 is in 𝐴 with high probability, otherwise it holds 𝑏󸀠 ∉ 𝐴.
It is immediate to see that the employment of Bloom filters in the matching process directly mitigates any centre-search attack for
template recovery.
Box 2
that can be successfully employed for privacy-preserving
biometric authentication [14, 31]. Homomorphic encryption
can be applied in a bit-by-bit mode making it possible to per-
form the matching process in the encrypted domain directly
[14]. More formally, HE allows translating operations on the
encrypted data (ciphertext) to some useful operations on the
corresponding plaintexts. In formulas,
Enc𝑘 (𝑚1) ∘ Enc𝑘 (𝑚2) = Enc𝑘 (𝑚1 × 𝑚2) , (1)
where 𝑚1, 𝑚2 are plaintext messages and Enc𝑘 corresponds
to a homomorphic encryption function under a public key
𝑘. If we consider that 𝑚1 = 𝑏
󸀠 is the fresh template of a
user ID and 𝑚2 = 𝑏 is the stored template of the same
user, then homomorphic encryption gives us the possibility
of performing operations on the encrypted templates and
compute the distance (e.g., Hamming distance) between
them. While HE protects biometric templates from user
traceability attacks (HE prevents user traceability given that
different databases store different/independent encryptions
of the same reference template), it does not directly protect
from other privacy attacks. For instance, Abidin et al. [23]
exploit exactly the homomorphic property to show that the
claimed privacy-preserving BAS in [14] is actually vulnera-
ble to the biometric template attack. Another limitation to the
employment of HE schemes is their computational cost, and
there are limitations on the number of multiplications that
can be performed between ciphertexts. Nevertheless, some
recently proposed schemes [32, 33] show promise regarding
the efficiency of HE.
Oblivious transfer (OT) (1-out-of-𝑁) [34] enables one
party the sender S to send one element out of 𝑁, to a
receiver R in such a way that the sender does not know
which element is received by R. Furthermore, R does not
find out anything about the other 𝑁 − 1 elements. If we
consider the elements to be the stored (encrypted) biometric
templates, we see that OT essentially allows one to search in
the database, without revealing which item (i.e., biometric
template) is selected for the matching process. This is a
very useful tool for privacy-preservation and assures perfect
resistance against user traceability and distinguishability [35].
Similarly to HE, however, OT alone cannot prevent some
template recovery attacks, since the best known strategy is
based solely on the value returned by the BAS (essentially
the acceptance/rejection message) which is not affected by
the OT technique.
Garbled circuits are a cryptographic technique that
enables two parties to compute a function (represented as a
binary circuit) and learn only the output of the function and
nothing else (e.g., the other party’s input) [36].This approach
combines OT and SMPC between two entities and thus is
quite relevant for achieving a privacy-preserving matching
process in biometric authentication. Up to now, garbled
circuits constitute the most promising cryptographic tool
to prevent template recovery attacks. A detailed description
of OT and garbled circuits in BAS can be found in [37].
4.2.2. Verifiable Computation in Biometric Authentication.
Verifiable computation (VC) techniques enable a client to
outsource computations to a remote server in a secure
way. After performing the calculations, the server returns
to the client the result together with a proof asserting
the correctness of the returned result (for the outsourced
computation). The client only needs to check the proof to
convince itself of the correctness of the returned output. At
first it might appear that VC has little or no connections to
biometric authentication; however the linking point lies in
the need for outsourcing thematching process to a third party
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(e.g., the computational server in the distributed architecture
depicted in Figure 1). Incorporating VC in a BAS in a
secure way allows speeding up the matching process, without
introducing additional privacy leakage; for example, it is
harder to perform centre search attacks. Recent works [15,
38] provide solutions on how to securely apply verifiable
computing techniques to the main algorithms for biometric
matching.
4.3. Error Correction BasedMethods. Theuse of error correc-
tion codes is an attractive mitigation to the inherently noisy
nature of biometric traits. Error correction, indeed, would
automatically decode small perturbation of a template into
the template itself, solving the problem of noisy data. In this
way, the systems can get error-free biometric templates and
thus successfully use cryptographic primitives that will not
affect the matching biometric process. This is, for instance,
the case for the fuzzy commitment scheme described by Juels
and Wattenberg in [39]. The biometric template is used as
a witness to commit to a secret codeword 𝑐. As long as the
fresh witness provided by the client is close to the used one, it
will correct to the same codeword 𝑐. The decoded codeword
will then be used in the commitment scheme. Typically the
witness is used as a key for the encryption/decryption and the
user authentication. Such systems could handle efficiently the
noisy nature of biometrics and subsequently cryptographic
primitives (hashing and/or encryption) could be employed.
From a theoretical point of view, these schemes are secure
against biometric reference and sample template attacks.
In order to recover either the biometric template or the
key, an attacker should indeed know the user’s biometric
data. However, given that the biometric templates are not
uniformly random, and practical error correcting codes do
not have high correction capability, the theoretical security
is not achievable in practice. It has been shown, indeed, that
fuzzy commitment schemes leak private information [10].
4.4. Other Noncryptographic Approaches. Given that OT is a
well-established countermeasure against user traceability and
distinguishability attacks, most noncryptographic tools for
privacy-preserving BAS focus on combating template and
sample recovery attacks.
For instance, [19] suggests to combat centre search attacks
by using weighted distances to compare the fresh template
with the stored one and to keep the weights secret and
different for each user. This procedure is adopted by the bio-
metric authentication protocols that employ the normalised
Hamming distance [40] or the weighted Euclidean distance
[41]. Even though the centre search attack might still be
feasible also in these scenarios, it will only lead to the
recovery of a subset of the components of the stored biometric
template.
Another alternative is to generalise the comparison pro-
cess to include multiple distances. More precisely, if the
matching process relies on such a mechanism that, at each
authentication attempt, a distance is randomly selected from
a predefined set of distances, thus, the attacker could not gain
any information about the stored template without knowing
first which distance has been used.
Similarly, changing the value of the threshold 𝜏 used
for the matching process at each authentication attempt
renders harder the implementation of the centre search
attack. However, such approachesmay have a negative impact
on the accuracy of the biometric authentication and may
increase the false acceptance and/or false rejection rates.
Finally, one could consider to combine Differential Pri-
vacy (DP) [42, 43] with biometric authentication, in order
to achieve privacy-preservation. Intuitively, DP allows users
to query a database and receive noisy answers, so that no
information leaked about the data stored in the database.
Although this combination of DPwith biometric authentica-
tion could possibly give an end to template recovery attacks
(i.e., centre search attacks), it could also have an impact
on the accuracy of the authentication process and thus, a
more detailed analysis of the achieved utility (accuracy) and
privacy-preservation needs to be performed.
5. Conclusions
This article discusses challenges in biometric authentication,
with a particular focus on privacy-preserving ones. We
highlight the main advantages of biometric authentication
as well as the risks that it brings along. We then list the
most dangerous threats against privacy-preserving BAS and
discuss possible attack strategies to undermine the privacy
of a BAS. Finally, we identify possible directions to mitigate
the highlighted threats, providing both the advantages and
the disadvantages of the proposed methods. The practicality
of privacy-preserving biometric authentication systems is by
itself a great motivation for finding solutions to the security
and privacy challenges connected to the employment of
biometrics in authentication systems.
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